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   Beate	  Rössler	  (ed.)	  
Privacies:	  Philosophical	  Evaluations	  Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2004	  ISBN	  0-­‐8047-­‐4564-­‐I	  	  RRP	  US$22.95	  (pb)	  	  This	   volume	   of	   essays	   is	   based	   on	   papers	   delivered	   at	   a	   conference	   on	   the	   theme	   of	   ‘New	  Perspectives	   in	  Privacy’	  held	  at	   the	  Amsterdam	  School	   for	  Cultural	  Analysis	   in	  1999.	   In	  her	  introduction,	  Beate	  Rössler	  outlines	  six	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  ‘privacy’:	  theories	  of	   the	   public	   sphere	   such	   as	   Jürgen	   Habermas’s;	   theories	   of	   civilisation	   such	   as	   Norbert	  Elias’s;	   sociological	   studies	   of	   private	   life,	   especially	   the	   family;	   feminist	   critiques	   of	  traditional	   liberal	   distinctions	   between	   the	   cultures	   of	   the	   public	   and	   private	   worlds;	  information	   theory;	   and	   the	  vast	   and	  varied	   law	  of	  privacy.	  This	  book	   consciously	   eschews	  the	  first	  category,	  and	  it	  is	  clearly	  at	  its	  strongest	  when	  dealing	  with	  privacy	  law	  and	  with	  the	  philosophy	  of	  privacy.	  Ten	  of	  the	  thirteen	  contributors	  are	  women,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  are	  handled	  from	  a	  feminist	  perspective.	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Although	  privacy-­‐related	  matters,	   broadly	   conceived,	   remain	  one	  of	   the	  most	   common	  areas	  of	  legal	  dispute,	  it	  is	  probably	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ‘law’	  of	  privacy	  is	  largely	  an	  American	  development	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   There	   is	   no	   right	   to	   privacy	   as	   such	   in	   English	   or	  Australian	   law,	   for	   example.	   When	   Princess	   Diana	   wanted	   to	   take	   legal	   action	   against	   the	  manager	  of	  the	  gymnasium	  where	  she	  worked	  out	  and	  the	  newspaper	  that	  published	  pictures	  of	  her	  there,	  there	  was	  no	  law	  of	  privacy	  in	  England	  that	  could	  protect	  her,	  and	  she	  had	  to	  sue	  for	  breach	  of	  confidence	  instead.	  As	  Anita	  Allen	  traces	  in	  her	  chapter	  on	  ‘Privacy	  in	  American	  Law’,	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  USA	  developed	  very	  differently.	  In	  1890,	  Louis	  Brandeis	  and	  Samuel	  Warren	  argued	   in	  an	   influential	  article	   in	   the	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	   that	   there	  was	   a	   right	   to	  privacy	  implied	  in	  common	  law.	  Although	  many	  of	  their	  arguments	  from	  case	  law	  were	  in	  fact	  drawn	  from	  English	  legal	  history,	  the	  authors	  were	  driven	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  apprehension	  at	  the	  potential	   for	   intrusion	   in	  private	   life	  created	  by	  the	  new	  media	  of	  scandal	  sheets	  and	  easily	  reproducible	  photographs.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  article	  on	  American	  legal	  history,	   or	   for	   that	  matter	   the	   role	  of	  Brandeis,	  who	   later	  become	  a	   Justice	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   on	   the	   law	  of	  privacy.	   In	  1905,	   the	   state	  of	  Georgia	  became	   the	   first	   in	   the	  Union	   to	  recognise	  a	  right	  to	  privacy	   in	   its	   tort	   law,	  and	  this	  direction	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  most	  US	  states.	  Similarly,	  although	   the	  US	  Constitution	  does	  not	  mention	   the	  word	   ‘privacy’	  as	  such,	  privacy	  interests	  are	  widely	  addressed	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  amendments,	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  In	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  which	  guarantees	  freedom	  from	  arbitrary	  search	  and	   seizure	   of	   persons	   and	   property,	   and	   the	   Fourteenth	   Amendment,	  which	   requires	   due	  process	   of	   law	   for	   any	  deprivation	   of	   a	   person’s	   life,	   liberty	   or	   property,	   have	   been	  widely	  used	  as	  defences	  against	  what	  many	  of	  us	  would	  regard	  as	  intrusions	  into	  our	  private	  lives.	  In	  the	  1960s	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  gave	  privacy	  a	  central	  role	   in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	   In	   Griswold	   vs	   Connecticut	   (1965),	   the	   court	   found	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	  privacy	  in	  the	  constitution	  that	  is	  sufficient	  to	  prohibit	  laws	  criminalising	  birth	  control.	  Most	  celebrated	   of	   all,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Roe	   vs	   Wade	   (1977),	   the	   Court	   found	   in	   the	   Fourteenth	  Amendment	   the	   source	   of	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	   privacy	   strong	   enough	   to	   block	   the	  categorical	  criminalisation	  of	  abortion.	  It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   this	   as	   a	   triumph	   of	   liberal	   humanism,	   but	   not	   everyone	   has	   been	  unequivocally	  happy	  about	  this	  trend.	  Some	  legal	   theorists	  and	  philosophers,	  not	   just	  right-­‐wing	   ones,	   have	   criticised	   the	   tendency	   to	   see	   so	  many	   kinds	   of	   legal	   interests	   as	   privacy	  interests,	   and	   have	   argued	   for	   a	   restriction	   of	   privacy	   law	   to	   those	   situations	   in	   which	  physical	   or	   informational	   intrusion	   is	   the	   issue.	   From	   a	   communitarian	   perspective,	   the	  privacy	   interests	   of	   individuals	   are	   frequently	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   public	   good.	   Privacy	  advocates	   attacked	   the	   HIV	   testing	   of	   newborn	   babies	   and	   they	   opposed	   mandatory	  
Peter Goodall—Theorising the Private Sphere	   193 
government	  access	  to	  encryption	  keys	   in	  electronic	  means	  of	  communication.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  
DeShaney	  vs	  Winnebago	  Department	  of	  Social	  Services	  (1989),	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  agreed	  that	  the	  state	  government	  need	  not	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  serious	  consequences	  of	   failing	  to	  remove	  a	  boy	  from	  his	  family	  home	  in	  which	  he	  had	  been	  severely	  beaten	  by	  his	  father.	  Most	  of	  all,	   feminists	  have	  criticised	   the	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  US	  privacy	   law	  that	   the	   family	  home,	  the	  private	  sphere	  par	  excellence,	  is	  a	  necessary	  haven	  from	  a	  cruel	  and	  hostile	  outside	  world,	   a	   place	   that	   guarantees	   safety	   no	  matter	   what	   the	   depredations	   and	   cruelty	   of	   the	  public	  sphere.	  In	  ancient	  times	  Aristotle	  saw	  the	  private	  life	  of	  the	  home	  as	  a	  place	  of	  tyranny	  outside	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  generations	  of	  American	  feminists	  from	  the	   time	  of	  Charlotte	  Perkins	  Gilman	  onwards	  have	  come	   to	  a	   similar	   conclusion,	   satirising	  the	  darker	  sides	  of	  private	  life	  in	  which	  the	  home	  is	  a	  prison	  and	  place	  of	  torture	  rather	  than	  a	  place	   of	   safety.	   Rössler’s	   critique	   of	   the	   liberal	   tradition	   of	   thought	   about	   privacy	   in	   her	  chapter	   on	   ‘Gender	   and	   Privacy’	   draws	   attention	   to	   what	   she	   calls	   the	   gender	   paradox	   of	  liberal	   theory,	   in	  which	  privacy	   is	   ‘the	   justification	  of	   the	   equality	   of	   every	  human	  being	  …	  [but]	  a	  right	  [granted]	  only	  to	  adult	  men’.	  (55)	  Other	  contributors	  to	  the	  volume	  make	  similar	  points.	   One	   interesting	   variant	   is	   Jean	   L	   Cohen’s	   study	   of	   the	   remarkable	   change	   in	  understanding	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘domain	  of	  intimacy’	  in	  the	  last	  forty	  years.	  As	  women	  have	  entered	   the	  workforce	   in	   large	  numbers	  and	  marriage	  has	  been	  decentred	   in	   the	   sphere	  of	  sexual	  relationships,	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  traditional	  domain	  of	  private	  life	  have	  entered	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Sexual	  harassment	  legislation	  has	  sometimes	  played	  an	  ambivalent	  role	  in	  this	  context.	   There	   has	   again	   been	   a	   liberal	   dilemma:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   intimate	   relations	   are	   a	  matter	  of	  personal	  choice,	  protected	  by	  basic	  privacy	  rights;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  intimacy	  can	  be	  a	  site	  of	  power	  relations	  as	  well.	  Not	  all	  feminists	  have	  seen	  sexual	  harassment	  legislation	  as	   the	  best	  way	   forward,	  however––Judith	  Butler	   is	   an	  obvious	  example.	  Cohen	   takes	   issue	  with	   the	  way	   in	  which	  many	   employers	   have	   developed	   repressive	   and	   intrusive	   ‘rules’	   of	  sexual	  behaviour	  in	  the	  workplace	  in	  order	  to	  guard	  themselves	  against	  litigation.	  For	  Cohen,	  many	  of	  these	  sex	  codes	  are	  founded	  in	  a	  puritanical	  attitude	  that	  sex	  is	  bad	  per	  se	  and	  that	  women	  are	  victims	  in	  need	  of	  protection,	  not	  just	  against	  the	  aggression	  of	  male	  sexuality	  but	  also	  against	  their	  own	  sick	  desires.	  If	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   law	   and	   philosophy	   of	   privacy	   is	   the	   strong	   point	   of	   the	  collection––the	  book	   is	   subtitled	   ‘philosophical	   evaluations’––it	   is	   not	   too	  hard	   to	   see	  what	  are	  some	  of	  its	  weaknesses.	  Although	  the	  book	  is	  part	  of	  a	  series	  called	  ‘Cultural	  Memory	  in	  the	   Present’,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   historical	   perspective	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   privacy:	   few	   of	   the	  essays	   have	   any	   historical	   range	   or	   reference,	   except	   for	   Allen’s	   essay	   on	   US	   privacy	   law,	  which	  includes	  data	  from	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  throughout	  the	  book	  that	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privacy	  is	  part	  of	  the	  problematic	  of	  ‘modernity’,	  but	  modern	  is	  unproblematically	  associated	  with	   an	   unhistoricised	   present.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   much	   better	   when	   discussing	   privacy	   to	   use	  modern	  in	  the	  way	  that	  historians	  commonly	  do,	  referring	  to	  the	  period	  from	  about	  1500	  in	  western	  Europe,	  roughly	  corresponding	  to	  the	  Renaissance	  and	  its	  aftermath.	  Curiously,	  the	  illustration	   on	   the	   cover	   of	   the	   paperback	   illustrates	   this	   very	  well:	   a	   seventeenth-­‐century	  Dutch	  interior,	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  maids	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  house	  is	  pointing	  mischievously	  to	  an	  alcove	  where	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  are	  embracing.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  period	  that	  the	  private	  ‘home’	  as	   most	   of	   us	   understand	   it,	   with	   its	   private	   rooms	   and	   sense	   of	   domestic	   space,	   its	  opportunities	   for	   the	   exercise	   of	   physical	   intimacy	   and	   solitude,	   was	   first	   created.	   It	   is	  unfortunate	  that	  none	  of	  the	  articles	  really	  takes	  up	  the	  history	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  privacy	  as	  a	  physical	   reality	  rather	   than	  as	  a	  mental	   state.	  Likewise,	   there	  are	  no	  contributions	  on	   the	  psychology	  of	  personal	  space	  despite	  the	  long	  history	  of	  the	  study	  of	  this	  topic	  since	  Edward	  Hall’s	  work	   in	   the	   1960s.	   There	   is	   no	   anthropology	   to	   give	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   various	  ways	   in	  which	  non-­‐western	  cultures	  construct	  private	  spaces	  or	  autonomous	  selves.	  Nor	  is	  there	  any	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘representation’	  of	  privacy	  in	  literature	  or	  art	  or	  of	  its	  long	  linguistic	  history	  in	  English	  since	  the	  Middle	  Ages.	  Some	  of	  these	  criticisms	  are	  taken	  up	  in	  an	  essay	  on	  ‘old	  age,	  extended	  care,	  and	  privacy’	  by	  Iris	  Marion	  Young.	  She	  criticises	  there	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  discussion	  of	  privacy	  as	  a	  ‘virtual’	  phenomenon,	   as	   if	   it	   were	   simply	   a	   cognitive	   or	   mental	   state.	   Young’s	   article––inevitably	  entitled	  ‘A	  Room	  of	  One’s	  Own’––is	  an	  attempt	  to	  draw	  the	  collection	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  some	  of	  the	  material	  bases	  of	  privacy	  through	  the	  study	  of	  the	  personal	  space	  made	  available	  to	  the	  elderly	   in	   nursing	   homes.	   As	   she	   points	   out,	   ‘for	   many	   people	   …	   their	   primary	   privacy	  problem	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  home’.	  (181)	  Her	  personal	  recollection	  of	  her	  stepfather’s	  loss	  of	   independence	   is	  a	  depressing	  narrative,	  but	   it	  also	  offers	  an	   invigorating	  contrast	   in	  style	  to	  the	  abstract	  nature	  of	  many	  of	  the	  articles.	  The	  loss	  of	  personal	  space	  even	  in	  a	  ‘good’	  nursing	   home	   can	   essentially	   destroy	   the	   elderly	   and	   infirm.	   Young’s	   stepfather	   had	   ten	  different	  roommates	  in	  the	  years	  he	  lived	  in	  a	  nursing	  home,	  his	  bathroom	  was	  shared	  with	  five	  other	  residents,	  his	  room	  had	  a	  door	  that	  was	  never	  closed,	  and	  staff	  and	  other	  residents	  wandered	  in	  constantly.	  Young’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  elderly	  are	  deprived	  of	  personal	  space	  in	  which	  genuinely	  to	  conduct	  private	  lives,	  ‘they	  have	  a	  truncated	  capacity	  for	  the	  formation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  person	  hood’.	  (181)	  The	   theme	   of	   Young’s	   essay	  may	   seem	   old-­‐fashioned––speaking	   of	   personhood	   rather	  than	   subjectivity	   and	   understanding	   this	   as	   a	   process	   in	   which	   the	   individual	   has	  considerable	   agency––but	   it	   is	   a	   curiously	   persistent	   and	   unavoidable	   subtext	   in	   the	  collection	  as	  a	  whole.	  Wendy	  Brown	  makes	  a	  comment	  of	  this	  nature	  in	  her	  response	  to	  Moira	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Gatens’s	   article	   on	   ‘Privacy	   and	   the	  Body’,	   detecting	   a	   tension	   in	  Gatens’s	   essay	  between	   ‘a	  formulation	   of	   the	   subject	   radically	   constructed	  by	   historical	   formations	   and	  norms	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	  a	  more	   liberal,	   essential,	   and	   self-­‐made	   subject	  on	   the	  other’.	   (138)	   In	   some	  ways	  it	  is	  remarkable	  how	  resistant	  the	  discussion	  of	  privacy,	  especially	  when	  it	  gets	  down	  to	  the	  details	  and	  desires	  of	   life	  as	   it	   is	   lived,	   is	   to	   the	  poststructuralist	  project.	  Gatens’s	  essay	  counters	   the	  abstractness	  of	  many	  of	   the	  views	  of	  privacy	   in	   the	  collection	  with	  a	  stress	  on	  the	   way	   in	   which	   ‘the	   privacy	   of	   individuals	   cannot	   be	   understood	   independently	   of	   the	  historical	   specificity	   of	   the	   social	   and	   political	   contexts	   within	   which	   such	   identities	   are	  formed’.	  (130)	  Her	  essay	  is	  not	  really	  an	  historical	  study	  of	  privacy,	  however,	  although	  it	  does	  exemplify	   the	   struggle	   for	   personhood	   and	   private	   life	   as	   it	   is	   presented	   in	   two	   literary	  classics	  of	  autobiography	  from	  different	  places	  and	  periods:	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  Autobiography	  and	  Sally	  Morgan’s	  My	  Place.	  In	  her	  studies	  of	  both	  texts,	  Gatens	  stresses	  how	  the	  self	  remains	  ‘a	   semipermeable	   embodied	   “site,”	   immanently	   connected	   to	   the	   vast	  web	   of	  more	   or	   less	  collective	   and	   anonymous	  practices,	   discourses,	   and	   affects	   that	   constitute	   various	  ways	   of	  life’.	  (116)	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  ‘web’	  around	  Mill’s	  life	  was	  vast	  and	  complex.	  He	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	   ‘constructed’	   men	   who	   ever	   lived,	   the	   subject	   of	   a	   planned	   upbringing,	   rigorously	  supervised	   by	   his	   father––Carlyle	   remarked	   wickedly	   that	   Mill’s	   book	   read	   like	   the	  autobiography	   of	   a	   steam	   engine.	   What	   Mill’s	   education	   lacked,	   of	   course,	   was	   domestic	  intimacy	  and	  emotional	  life,	  and	  eventually	  he	  suffered	  a	  nervous	  collapse.	  Only	  gradually	  did	  Mill	   learn	   the	   ‘culture	   of	   the	   feelings’	   through	   reading	  Wordsworth’s	   poetry,	   and	   begin	   to	  develop	  an	   inner	   life	  and	   from	  there	   to	   form	  friendships	  with	  other	  men	  and	  women,	   to	  be	  part	  of	  what	  Gatens	  terms	  the	  ‘transindividuality	  of	  affect’.	  Although	  this	  book	  of	  essays	  by	  different	  contributors	  suffers	   from	  some	  limitations	  of	  the	   genre––inconsistency	   and	   patchiness	   of	   focus,	   uneven	   length	   and	   quality	   of	   individual	  contributions––it	  is	  a	  useful	  introduction	  to	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  problems	  and	  issues	  that	  surround	   the	   theme	  of	  privacy.	  The	   interdisciplinary	  history	  of	  privacy	   in	  English-­‐speaking	  culture––a	  book	  or	  series	  of	  books	  fit	  to	  stand	  comparison	  with	  Georges	  Duby’s	  Histoire	  de	  la	  
Vie	  Privée	  for	  French––remains,	  however,	  as	  yet	  unwritten.	  —	  Peter	  Goodall	  is	  currently	  the	  Acting	  Dean	  of	  Humanities	  at	  Macquarie	  University	  in	  Sydney.	  His	   publications	   are	   mainly	   on	   medieval	   literature	   and	   twentieth-­‐century	   British	   fiction,	  especially	  the	  work	  of	  George	  Orwell.	  He	  has	  published	  several	  articles	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  private	  life	  in	  English	  literature.	  
